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Abstract
This paper studies the security of a chaotic cryptosystem based
on the Chua circuit and implemented with State Controlled Cellular
Neural Networks. It is shown that the plaintext can be retrieved by
ciphertext band-pass filtering after an imperfect decoding with wrong
receiver parameters. It is also shown that the key space of the sys-
tem can be notably reduced easing a brute force attack. The system
parameters were determined with high precision through the analysis
of the decoding error produced by the mismatch between receiver and
transmitter parameters.
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1 Introduction
The possibility of synchronization of two coupled chaotic systems was first
shown by Pecora and Carrol [1, 2], due to the nonpredictable behavior of
chaotic variables, it was soon envisaged the possibility of using them in
the field of secure communications in the same way as the withe noise and
∗
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random sequences were used in classical cryptography, accordingly, a great
number of cryptosystems based on chaos have been proposed [3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9]; some of them fundamentally flawed by a lack of robustness and
security [7, 10, 11].
The Chua circuit [12, 13] is a simple chaotic circuit considered the
paradigm of chaos. It is defined in its dimensionless form by the follow-
ing state equations:
x˙ = α [y − h(x)] ,
y˙ = x− y + z, (1)
z˙ = −βy,
with h(x) = m1x+0.5(m1−m0)(|x+1| − |x− 1|), where x, y and z are the
system variables; x˙, y˙ and z˙, are the derivative the variables with respect to
the time τ ; α, β, m0 and m1 are the system parameters.
In [14] a Generalized Cellular Neural Network (CNN) Cell Model, was
introduced, it was shown that it was possible to implement the Chua circuit
using a State Controlled Cellular Neural Network (SC-CNN) formed by the
suitable interconnection of tree generalized CNN cells, it is defined by the
following state equations:
x˙1 = −x1 + s11x1 + s12x2 + a1y1,
x˙2 = −x2 + s21x1 + s23x3, (2)
x˙3 = −x3 + s32x2 + s33x3,
where y1 = 0.5(|x1 + 1| − |x1 − 1|).
It can be seen that Eqs. (1) are a particular case of Eqs. (2) if:
a1 = α(m1 −m0); s11 = 1− αm1; s12 = α; s21 = s23 = s33 = 1; s32 = β.
Recently it was proposed a new chaotic cryptosystem implemented with
State Controlled Cellular Neural Network (SC-CNN) [15, 16], it was based
on chaotic masking system with feedback algorithm [17]. The results of a
PSpice simulation were presented in [15] and its hardware implementation
was described in [16]. The cryptosystem transmitter was defined as:
x˙1 = −x1 + s11x1 + s12x2 + a1y1,
x˙2 = −x2 +m(t) + s23x3, (3)
x˙3 = −x3 + s32x2 + s33x3,
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Figure 1: (a) Variable x1(t) of the transmitter; (b) plaintext s(t); (c) ci-
phertext m(t) = x1(t) + s(t); (d) retrieved plaintext at the receiver end
s′(t).
where m(t) = x1(t) + s(t) is the ciphertext, s(t) is the plaintext and t is the
variable time. It can be observed the ciphertext m(t) feedback in the in the
second equation of the system.
The cryptosystem receiver was defined as:
x˙′1 = −x
′
1 + s11x
′
1 + s12x
′
2 + a1y
′
1,
x˙′2 = −x
′
2 +m(t) + s23x
′
3, (4)
x˙′3 = −x
′
3 + s32x
′
2 + s33x
′
3,
where y′1 = 0.5(|x
′
1 + 1| − |x
′
1 − 1|).
The recovered plaintext s′(t) at the receiver end was calculated as:
s′(t) = m(t)− x′1(t).
In [15, 16] it was given an example with the following values: α = 9,
β = 14+ 2
7
, m0 = −
1
7
, m1 =
2
7
, s(t) = sin(2pi1000 t), as the circuit was
implemented with real resistances and capacitors of a particular value, it
turns out that the time response of the circuit remain multiplied by a time
factor of value t/τ = 106/51, with respect to the dimensionless case.
The signal waveforms of the variable x1, plaintext, ciphertext and re-
3
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Figure 2: Power spectrum of the x1(t) transmitter variable.
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Figure 3: Chua atractor trajectory projected onto the (x2, x1) plane.
trieved text are illustrated in Fig. 1. In the Fig. 2 the frequency power
spectrum of the x1(t) transmitter variable is depicted, it can be seen that
most of the energy is located at the band below 2 kHz, this energy corre-
sponds high amplitude slow oscillations of x1(t), there are also some power
components of high frequency, that corresponds to the small amplitude rip-
ple of x1(t).
The Fig. 3 shows the double scroll Chua attractor formed by the pro-
jection on the (x2, x1) plane, in the phase space, of a trajectory portion
extending along 0.2 s, for the parameter values of the example in [15, 16].
The Chua attractor trajectory draws two 3D loops, in the vicinity of the
equilibrium points P+ and P−, with a spiral like shape of steadily growing
amplitude, jumping from one of them to the other, at irregular intervals,
in a random like manner. The trajectory may pass arbitrarily near to the
equilibrium points, but never reach them while in chaotic regime. The two
asterisks show the location of the attractor equilibrium points, of coordi-
nates x1P± = ±(1−
m0
m1
), x2P± = 0, x3P± = ∓(1−
m0
m1
); the jumps between
loops corresponds to the low frequency components of the spectrum, while
the turns around the equilibrium points corresponds to the high frequency
components.
In the present paper it is discussed the weaknesses of this secure com-
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munication system, in the section 2 the weakness of the cryptosystem are
analyzed and in sections 3 and 4 it is shown how to break it by filtering and
by parameter identification.
2 Problems with the cryptosystem definition
Although the authors of [15, 16] seemed to base the security of its cryptosys-
tem on the chaotic behavior of the output of the Chua circuit, no analysis
of security was included and no indications about key selection, allowable
plaintext frequency or amplitude and system initial conditions.
2.1 Missing key specification
The first issue to be considered in a cryptosystem is the secret key, a cryp-
tosystem cannot exist without a key. When cryptanalyzing a cryptosystem,
the general assumption made is that the cryptanalyst knows exactly the
design and working of the cryptosystem under study, i.e., he knows every
detail about the ciphering algorithm, except the secret key. This is an evi-
dent requirement in today secure communications systems, usually referred
to as principle of Kerchoff [18]. In [15, 16] it was not considered whether
there should be a key in the proposed system, what it should consist of,
what the available key space would be (how many different keys exist in
the system), what precision to use, and how it would be managed. None of
these elements should be neglected when describing a secure communication
system [19, 20].
2.2 Reduced hypothetical key space
A typical assumption of most chaotic cryptosystems designers is that the
system parameters play the role of key [11], such premise will be assumed
in the rest of the article.
The simplest strategy for breaking a cryptosystem is known as brute
force attack and consist of trying every possible key on the key space. The
attack will be affordable in the case of small key space, hence the number
of possible keys must be as huge as possible. Nowadays the veteran Data
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Encryption Standard is considered obsolete and abandoned because it has
only 7.2× 1016 different keys!
The problem of using the Chua circuit as a cryptosystem is that the
number of possible different combinations of useful parameter values is very
short. In [21, 22] it is shown that the Chua circuit exhibit almost every
known bifurcation and chaotic phenomenon described in the literature. Its
manifold is quite complex, hence it is known as the chaos paradigm. Differ-
ent combinations of parameters α and β lead to many different trajectories
projected onto the (x2, x1) plane, among them: double-scroll strange attrac-
tor, sinks, asymmetric periodic orbits, period n orbits, Ro¨ssler like spiral,
heteroclinic orbits, homoclinic orbits and repulsive foci. The only attractor
behavior suitable for masking the plaintext is the double-scroll attractor,
other behaviors give place to a very simple waveforms that can not hide the
plaintext in an efficient manner; but, unfortunately, the region of the (α, β)
plane giving rise to it is a small fraction of about 4% of all possible combi-
nations of parameter values, as shown in [21, 22]. Hence a hypothetical key
space based on the system parameters would be quite small.
This situation is worsened by the fact that some Chua circuit parameters
have a direct relation with the coordinates x1 of the attractor equilibrium
points P+ and P−, that can be approximately delimited watching at the
ciphertext waveform, what reduces further the key space, as described in
the section 4.
2.3 Dangerous initial conditions
For the parameter values of the example given in [15, 16], there are many
unstable periodic orbits embedded in the double scroll attractor. If for any
reason during the operation of the system some special points are reached, or
the initial conditions include them, the system becomes unstable with ever
growing amplitude of the variables, such points must be considered forbidden
during normal operation, one of this isolated points is {x1(0), x2(0), x3(0)} =
{1.83487, 0, 2.53784}. A complete forbidden region of the attractor orbit
and/or initial conditions correspond to the values x2 ≥ 1.08, for any value
of x1 and x3.
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2.4 Unacceptable plaintexts
As the plaintext is feeded with high amplitude into the transmitter Eqs. (3),
the normal behavior of the Chua circuit is disturbed. It was found that for
plaintext frequencies ranging from 4700 Hz to 4970 Hz the attractor orbit
remained synchronized with the plaintext after some miliseconds following
the initiation. This is a very dangerous situation because the ciphertext
reveals the plaintext.
If the plaintext frequency is comprised between 4970 Hz and 12500 Hz
a unstable periodic orbit of about 9500 Hz takes place, hence the system is
not operable for plaintexts with frequencies inside this margin. It must be
concluded that the acceptable plaintext frequency margin must be limited
between 0 Hz and less than 4700 Hz, i.e. it seems that it is designed as to
encipher speech signals.
3 Breaking the system by bandpass filtering
The main problem with the cryptosystem proposed in [15, 16] is that the
synchronism mechanism between transmitter and receiver is excessively ro-
bust, as a result of a design oriented to avoid the problems presented by
the customary chaotic masking systems. The consequence is that an al-
most correct synchronism can be reached for an infinite number of receiver
parameter combinations, for each given transmitter parameter set.
The Fig. 4 illustrates this problem. The system signals are depicted
for the transmitter parameter values of the the example in [15, 16] α = 9,
β = 14.2857, m1 = 0.2857, m0 = −0.1428; and an arbitrary chosen set of
receiver parameters values, far away from those of the transmitter: α′ = 17,
β′ = 23.3, m′1 = 0.1366, m
′
0 = −m
′
1/2.
It can be appreciated that the waveform of the receiver chaotic variable
x′1(t) resembles pretty much the corresponding one x1(t) of the transmit-
ter. Hence the retrieved plaintext s′(t) differs from the original plaintext
s(t) mainly in the high frequency components, i.e. the jumps between the
equilibrium points are alike, but the rate and amplitude of turns around
them are different, which causes a high frequency noise on the retrieved
plaintext. This noise can be easily removed by filtering. The Fig. 4 (f)
shows the recovered plaintext after filtering it with a finite impulse response
7
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Figure 4: Plaintext retrieving with wrong parameter guessing; (a) transmit-
ter chaotic variable x1(t); (b) ciphertext m(t) = x1(t) + s(t); (c) receiver
chaotic variable x′1(t); (d) plaintext s(t); (e) retrieved plaintext s
′(t); (f)
bandpass filtered retrieved plaintext s′(t).
digital bandpass filter, with 200 taps and a frequency response of 300 Hz to
3.400 Hz, which is the typical bandwidth of telephone loops.
4 Breaking the system by parameter determina-
tion
A possible way to break the system is the brute force attack, which consists
of trying all the possible values of its parameters, until a meaningful and
noise-free plaintext is obtained. The number of different combinations could
be significantly high, therefore the time needed to try all of them could be
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Figure 5: Region of the (α, β) plane giving rise to the double-scroll attractor.
enormous, making the envisaged task unattainable. Fortunately the param-
eters search range may be dramatically reduced in various ways, first by
previous study of the cryptosystem characteristics and, second, analyzing
the ciphertext waveform.
4.1 Key space reduction
In section 2.2 it was mentioned that the region of the (α, β) plane giving
rise to the double-scroll attractor in a Chua circuit is a small fraction of all
possible combinations of parameter values α and β. As the system [15, 16]
differs from the ordinary Chua circuit in that it makes use of feedback, it may
have a different behavior than this one; hence the region of the (α, β) plane
giving rise to the double-scroll attractor was experimentally investigated
for different combinations of m0 and m1 values, the results are depicted in
the Fig. 5, the points inside this region may cause or not a double scroll
attractor, depending on the values of m0 and m1, but the points outside
this region never cause a double scroll attractor for any combination of m0
and m1 values, therefore they are not suitable for hiding information and
need not be investigated when mounting a brute force attack; the region
that must be investigated is approximately delimited by the curves β =
0, 0062α2 + 0.92α + .5 and β = 0, 157α2 − 0.16α + 12. Hence the usable
key space is notably reduced.
Correspondingly, the region of the (m0,m1) plane giving rise to the
double-scroll attractor may also be delimited from the Chua circuit defi-
nition and from the ciphertext as follows.
According to the definition the Chua system the parameters m0 and
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Figure 6: Equilibrium points estimation; (a) transmitter chaotic variable
x1(t) with x1P+ and x1P− ; (b) plaintext s(t); (c) ciphertext m(t) = x1(t)+
s(t); (d) absolute value of ciphertext |m(t)|.
m1 are defined as m0 = (Ga/G) + 1 and m1 = (Gb/G) + 1, were G is a
positive conductance while Ga and Gb are the two negative conductances
of the equivalent circuit of the Chua’s nonlinear resistor, they satisfy the
relation Ga < Gb < 0, hence it follows that 1 > m1 > m0. If the coordinates
of the attractor equilibrium points x1P± = ±(1−
m0
m1
) could be determined
a tighter relationship between m0 and m1 could be established.
If the undisturbed transmitter chaotic variable would be accessible, the
coordinate x1P± = ±(1−
m0
m1
) of the equilibrium points P± could be deter-
mined from the variable waveform. Figure 6 (a) shows the waveform of x1(t)
and the true values of x1P+ and x1P− , corresponding to the example given
in [15, 16]; as can be seen it is not a difficult task to approximate the value
of x1P+ or x1P− as the equidistant line between the relative maxima and
minima of the positive part or the negative part, respectively, of the x1(t)
waveform.
But as the only accessible data to an opponent cryptanalyst is the ci-
phertext m(t) = x1(t)+ s(t), depicted in Fig. 6 (c), the transmitter variable
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Figure 7: Power spectrum of the receiver decoding error ε, with transmitter
parameters: α = 9, β = 14.2857, m0 = −0.1428, m1 = 0.2857; and receiver
parameters: α′ = 4.5, β′ = 9, m′0 = −0.12, m
′
1 = 0.21.
x1(t) remains obscured by the presence of the plaintext, so only a coarse es-
timation of x1P± can be attained, never the less the value may be delimited
effectively, establishing two easily measurable bounds. As x1P+ = −x1P− ,
it is preferable to work with the absolute value of m(t), represented in
Fig. 6 (d). The value of |x1P± | can be delimited between the bounds x1max
and x1mean, being the first one the maximum value of |m(t)| and the second
one the mean of |m(t)|. It is evident from Fig. 6 (d) that |x1P± | < x1max(t)
and it was found experimentally, for a large assortment of parameter val-
ues and plaintexts, that in any case |x1P± | > |x1mean(t)|. In the example
of [15, 16] the true value of m0
m1
is m0
m1
= −0.5, hence |x1P± | = 1−
m0
m1
= 1.5,
which is in good agreement with the bounds that were experimentally found
x1M = 3.00 and x1m = 1.41. This fact allows for an important reduc-
tion of the search range of all the possible values of m0 and m1. As
x1M = 3.00 > ±(1 −
m0
m1
) > x1m = 1.41 and 1 > m1 > m0, it follows
that 1 > m1 > 0 and −0, 41m1 > m0 > −2m1. Again the key space is
additionally reduced.
4.2 Parameter determination
As illustrated in Fig. 2, the transmitter variable x1(t), which acts as a noise
to mask the plaintext, has two well differentiated frequency bands. The first
one is the low frequency band, with spectral components comprised between
0 Hz and 3 kHz, corresponding to the jumps of the atractor between the two
loops centered at the equilibrium points P+ and P−, this part effectively
conceals the plaintext, that has the same frequency band. The second one is
the high frequency band, located beyond 6 kHz, corresponding to the loops
of the attractor trajectory around the equilibrium points.
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Figure 8: Power of the high frequency components of the decoding error
ε, for different sets of receiver parameters values: α′ = {4, . . . , 20}; m′1 =
{0.01, . . . , 0.9}; m′0 = {0.01, . . . , 1.8}
When the the ciphertext is decoded with an unauthorized receiver, with
wrong parameter guessing, the retrieved plaintext s′(t) = m(t) − x′1(t) =
s(t) + x1(t) − x
′
1(t) is composed by the plaintext and the decoding error
ε = x1(t) − x
′
1(t), that can be considered as an unwanted masking noise.
If the receiver and sender parameters were equal the decoding error will
disappear, consequently a strategy to retrieve the plaintext may consist
of determining the receiver parameters that minimize the decoding error.
Unfortunately the noise and the plaintext share the low frequency band of
the spectrum, hence it is impossible their complete separation; but still it is
possible to separate the high frequency band of the decoding error.
The Fig. 7 illustrates the power spectrum of this error, the low fre-
quency components are mixed with the plaintext; but the high frequency
components are far from the plaintext frequencies, therefore the decoding
error created by the high frequencies of ε can be easily extracted from the
ciphertext by means of high-pass filter with cut-off frequency of 6.5 kHz.
The Fig. 9 illustrates the logarithm of the power of the high frequency
components of the decoding error ε, for different sets of receiver parame-
ters α′, m′1 and m
′
0 in function of the β
′ parameter. It can be seen that
the minimum decoding error is reached when the transmitter and receiver
parameters agree. All the curves show the same tendency: the decoding
error grows with the mismatch between the transmitter and receiver param-
eters, their relative minima is reached for values near to the values of the
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Figure 9: Story of the parameters value approximation.
corresponding parameters in the transmitter.
To determine the parameter values an iterative optimization procedure
was developed; it consisted of a number of approximation rounds, in each
round the four parameters were varied one each time, looking for the mini-
mum decoding error; the first round started from a set of arbitrary param-
eters α′ = 5, β′ = 7, m′1 = 0.1, m
′
0 = 0.2, it were tried 31 values of each
parameter inside the limited range defined in the section 4.1 and the value
giving rise to the lowest decoding error was retained; in each next round the
margin of variation of each parameter was progressively reduced; the proce-
dure finished when a stable repeat value of the parameters was reached, the
number of required rounds were 30 and the elapsed computing time was 965
seconds, in a 4 GHz Pentium Dual. The Fig. 9 illustrates the story of the
procedure, sowing the variation of each parameter in function of the round
number. The parameters values were determined with a precision of five to
six significative digits, allowing for the exact retrieving of the plaintext.
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4.3 Conclusion
The secure communication system described in [15, 16] was studied. It
was found that the synchronism mechanism is excessively robust, the conse-
quence is that an almost correct synchronism can be reached for an infinite
number of receiver parameter combinations, therefore the plaintext can be
retrieved by simple band-pass filtering after decoding the ciphertext with a
receiver with wrong parameters.
It was also found that the key space of the system can be notably reduced
by means of the study of the geometric properties and the the chaotic regions
of the Chua atractor, making feasible a brute force attack. Finally the
parameters of the system were determined with high precision analyzing and
minimizing the decoding error created by the mismatch between receiver and
transmitter parameters.
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